

Title: Protests, Public Sector Unions, and Police Reform: Studying the Efficacy of Police Reform Protests

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Introduction: State legislatures have begun taking on much more significant roles in the policy arena, creating legislative fissures between states. This project expands on the work of Amenta et. al (2010), quantitatively answering the question: what are the consequences of social movements, and in this case, what are the policy consequences of police reform protests at the state level, and will police unions depress these effects?

Methods/Research Design:

- Cross-Sectional Study for 2020
- N = 50 (Data collected for each state in the U.S.)
- Data from 2020 exclusively (Public sector union data from 2018)


Variables:

- IV: Average Number of Protest Attendees by Protest
- DV: Average Number of Police Reform Bills
- Controls: Average Number of Public Sector Unions, Party Control of State

Data:

- Count Love Protest Data (CountLove.org)
- Legislative Responses for Policing-State Bill Tracking Database (National Conference of State Legislatures)
- State Partisan Composition Data (NCSL)
- Automated Estimates of State Interest Group Lobbying Populations (Garlick and Cluverius Harvard Dataverse 2020)

What affects the impact of police reform protests?



Party Control over State Legislatures!
 The size of police reform protests matters when bringing about reform if Democrats have control over both the executive and legislative branch of the state.

Hypotheses:

H1: The size and number of protests will have a positive effect on the number of bills that are passed and proposed due to the salience of racial justice issues in media coverage and less gridlock at the state level.

H2: The size and number of protests will have no effect on the number of bills that are passed and proposed due to increasing levels of partisanship and police union power at the state level.

Regression Analysis: Model 3 in this Figure 1.1 showcases a significant jump in the average number of police reform bills when accounting for Democratic control over states. In Model 1, we know that protests have a slight effect on variation in police reform bills, but Models 3 and 4, when accounting for Democratic control, showcase much greater positive variation in the dependent variable.

Figure 1.1

Dependent Variable: Number of Police Reform Bills Enacted in 2020

Independent Variable(s)	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Attendees	1.095** (0.352)	0.931* (0.427)	0.768+ (0.398)	
Public Sector Unions		0.0111 (0.0161)	0.00572 (0.0150)	-0.00123 (0.0148)
Democratic Control			2.522** (0.837)	-15.18* (6.639)
Attendees/Dem Control				1.642** (0.604)
Constant	-10.07* (3.790)	-8.596+ (4.376)	-7.469+ (4.059)	0.768 (0.525)
N	50	50	50	50
Adj. R-sq	0.151	0.141	0.267	0.318

Standard errors in parentheses
 + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

